NGOs and other non-profit organizations attract workers who strongly identify themselves with their missions. We study whether these "good guys" are more trustworthy and how such pronounced group identities affect trust and trustworthiness within the groups and toward outgroups. We find that subjects who strongly identify themselves with a non-profit mission are more trustworthy in a minimal group setting but also harshly discriminate against out-groups when subjects are grouped by the missions they identify themselves with.
to trustors who also identify themselves with an NGO. The comparison with the minimal group treatment shows that the difference in the back transfers toward in-and out-groups is completely driven by negative discrimination of the out-group. These findings suggest that mismatches between worker and leadership missions or between the missions of different organizations could be detrimental for cooperation inside and between organizations. 
Experimental Design
In the beginning, before receiving instructions for the trust game, subjects are asked to fill in a short questionnaire on their computer screens. The questionnaire includes questions like "Do you do sports?", "Do you play an instrument?", and the question "Do you strongly identify yourself with the goals of one of the NGOs, Amnesty International or the WWF?". The last question is the one we use in our mission treatment. It has the following answer options: "WWF", "Amnesty International" and "None of the two". One option has to be checked and multiple answers are ruled out. In the minimal group treatment, we use a different question from the same questionnaire to form groups: "Do you like one of the painters: Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinski?" with answer options, "Klee", "Kandinsky" and "None of the two". With this treatment we relate to the classic social psychology study in this field by Tajfel et al. (1971) in which preferences about Klee and Kandinski are used as well to form "minimal" groups. The questionnaire is designed to give the subjects the impression that they take part in a small socioeconomic survey to make it unlikely that they expect that their answers play a role in the experiment.
After reading the instructions and a short comprehension quiz, subjects play a trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995) in which transfer choices are limited to 4 options. Half of the subjects are trustors the other half trustees. All recipients receive an initial endowment of 12 points. Trustors can transfer 0, 4, 8 or 12 points to the trustee. The transfers are tripled. The trustees can then send back any integer amount of points from the points they dispose of back to the trustor.
Trustors and trustees can make their transfer decision in the investment game conditional on the type of the recipient, i.e., on the answer of their partner to the NGO question in the mission treatment and on the answer to the art question in the minimal group treatment. The strategy method is used. Trustors make three transfer decisions, one for each potential type of trustee. Trustees make twelve decisions, one for every possible type of trustor and received transfer.
3 In addition to the transfer decisions, we ask the trustors about their 2 The related problem of worker-leadership mission mismatches for worker motivation is discussed in Besley and Ghatak (2005) . 3 The use of the strategy method in an investment game has been shown to lead to lower trustworthiness as compared to the "direct response" method (Casari and Cason 2009 ). In the context of this experiment, this might lead to an attenuation of the effect of group identity on trustworthiness. Having subjects make transfers to the different groups of recipients appears natural when the goal is to study whether they discriminate beliefs regarding back transfers for all possible transfer levels and types of trustees. The answers to these questions have no influence on the pay-offs. After the transfers are made and the beliefs elicited, the experiment ends and the subjects are paid out. One point in the trust game is worth CHF 0.8 (at the time of the experiment CHF 1 was worth USD 0.9). Overall, 190 subjects (52% female) participated in the experiment in the laboratory of the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich.
4 On average the participants earned CHF 14.8 in addition to a show-up fee of CHF 10 and spent around 45 minutes in the lab. Figure 1 presents the expected back transfers from different types of trustees, i.e., beliefs about their trustworthiness. We see that trustors expect lower back transfers from subjects who do not strongly identify themselves with the goals of either NGO (henceforth called No-NGO types). Regressing expected back transfers from each group on the transfers (i.e., estimating linear fits for the three groups in Fig. 1 ) results in statistically significantly steeper slopes for WWF and AI than for No-NGO (p<0.01, F-Test, Regression (1), Table 2 ).
Results
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Moreover, we see that the beliefs about back transfers from AI and WWF types are almost the same. Table 1 shows the transfer levels to the different types of trustees from the different types of trustors. The differences between the transfer levels reflect the beliefs about the back transfers. Even the No-NGO types transfer less to other No-NGO types than to AI or WWF types. For the No-NGO types, the differences of the transfer levels to the three trustee types are pairwise statistically different (p<0.05, Wilcoxon rank sum test). For the other two groups the transfer level to No-NGO types is statistically different (p<0.05) to the transfer to the other two groups which themselves are not significantly different from each other (p>0.1). Transfers to No-NGO types are lower than to any other group. The NGO types receive, on average, 47% higher transfers than No-NGO types. The lower half of Table 1 shows the transfer levels in the minimal group treatment. Here, each type of trustor favors trustees with the same art preferences but there is no single group that is less trusted than all the other groups.
Trustee Behavior
In the analysis of trustee behavior we start by looking at the trustworthiness of the different NGO types in the minimal group treatment where they cannot condition their back transfer between these groups.
4 The treatments were programmed with zTree (Fischbacher 2007) . 5 This finding holds for all types of trustors (see models (2)- (4) in Table 2 ). on the NGO type of the trustor. This allows us to see whether the NGO types are more trustworthy when the group identity is unrelated to their NGO identification. In the minimal group treatment the transfers have to be conditioned on the art preferences of the trustor. As we used the same questionnaire for both the minimal group and mission treatments, we can group the results by the answers to the NGO question. Figure 2 presents the back transfers averaged over the three potential recipient types ("Klee", "Kandinski", and "No-Artist") for all potential transfers. We see that people who identify themselves with one of the NGOs are more trustworthy than people who do not. Regressing back transfer on transfer gives significantly different slopes for the AI group than for the No-NGO group (p<0.05, F-Test, Regression 5, Table  2 ).
6 Pooling the AI and the WWF group in the regression gives a significantly different slope of this combined NGO group to the No-NGO group slope (p<0.05, F-Test, Regression 6, Table 2 ). The slope of the WWF group alone is not significantly different to the slopes of the No-NGO group (p>0.1, Regression 5, Table 2 ) and the AI group (p>0.1). Note: Each panel displays the coefficients (and their 95% confidence intervals) of regressions of back transfers from a different group of trustees on transfers from a different group of trustors. Full results from the regression models are reported in Table 3 .
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Next we study what happens if subjects are grouped by their NGO identification. Figure 3 , which shows the estimated coefficients from regressing back transfers on transfers for the different groups, gives a clear picture. We see that the NGO types strongly discriminate against No-NGO types. Regressing back transfer on transfer by trustor type gives significantly different coefficients for AI and WWF types than from No-NGO types (p<0.05, F-Test, Regressions 7 and 8, Table 3 ). It is also the case that WWF types favor other WWF types over AI types (p<0.05). This might be explained by the mere in-group effect which is present even when group formation is arbitrary as in the artist treatment. The lower half of Figure 3 shows that there are small differences between the slopes for the different artist types. These differences are small, though, compared to the difference between the NGO and the No-NGO group (Regressions 10-12, Table 3 ). All differences except for one (back transfers to Kandinski and to No-Artist from Kandinski trustees) are insignificant (p>0.1, F-tests). We also find that No-NGO types do not discriminate between the trustor groups (third panel in upper half of Figure 3 and Regression 9 in Table 3 ). < 0.01, * * * < 0.001. In models (7)- (9) The comparison of the behavior of the NGO types in the two treatments reveals a strong negative discrimination against out-groups and no positive discrimination of in-groups. A regression of back transfers from WWF or AI types on transfers from either group in the mission treatment and from trustors in the minimal group treatment (the three artist groups pooled), gives us four coefficients (Regressions 13 and 14, Table 4 ). The coefficient for a transfer from an artist type is statistically not different to the coefficients for a transfer from a WWF or from an AI type (p>0.1, F-tests). However, the slope coefficient for a transfer from a No-NGO type is significantly smaller than the slope coefficient for a transfer from an artist type (p<0.05, F-test). This suggests that negative discrimination of out-group subjects is the main driver of the differences in back transfers in the mission treatment. (14) and (15) back transfers from AI and WWF types, respectively, in both treatments are the dependent variable.
Conclusion
We find that subjects who identify themselves with non-profit missions are more trustworthy if they interact with somebody with the same mission or if they interact in a neutral setting in which they do not know the (potential) pro-social mission of their partner. Attracting such individuals might be beneficial for organizations in the non-profit sector and possibly explain different compensation schemes, such as fixed salaries, as compared to more performance based remuneration schemes in for-profit organizations (e.g., Ballou and Weisbrod 2003) . However, when the group identity of the organization is salient and there is an out-group that does not share it, strong discrimination might result. Besley and Ghatak (2005) discuss possible detrimental effects on worker motivation if an organization hires a new principal who is not dedicated to the organization's mission. This would, for example, be the case if an NGO hires a financial expert who has gained no merits as an activist. Our results suggest that such a mission mismatch might also be detrimental for trust inside the organization. They also suggest that trust between groups with very different goals, e.g., between an environmental NGO and an industrial producer, might be very low. This would make cooperations between them, e.g., in the context of a corporate social responsibility program, difficult. It seems that strong identification with a good cause goes hand in hand with intolerance toward out-groups. 
